CVE-2026-5460 wolfSSL堆释放后重用漏洞

/* * Conceptual PoC for CVE-2026-5460 * This code simulates the UAF condition where a KyberKey object * is freed and then accessed via ForceZero. */ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> typedef struct { int id; char secret_data[64]; } KyberKey; // Simulate the ForceZero function that zeroes out sensitive data void ForceZero(KyberKey* key) { if (key) { printf("[*] Calling ForceZero on pointer: %p\n", (void*)key); memset(key, 0, sizeof(KyberKey)); } } // Simulate the internal processing function that encounters an error void ProcessPqcClient_ex(KyberKey** key_ptr) { printf("[*] Processing PQC Client data...\n"); // Simulate an error condition printf("[!] Error encountered. Freeing KyberKey object.\n"); free(*key_ptr); *key_ptr = NULL; // In the actual bug, this might not be reflected to the caller immediately or logic is flawed } // Simulate the vulnerable caller function void TLSX_KeyShare_ProcessPqcHybridClient() { KyberKey* myKey = (KyberKey*)malloc(sizeof(KyberKey)); if (!myKey) return; myKey->id = 12345; strcpy(myKey->secret_data, "SENSITIVE_PQC_DATA"); // Call internal processing ProcessPqcClient_ex(&myKey); // Vulnerability: Caller assumes myKey might still need cleanup or logic error leads to double free/use-after-free // The bug description says: "caller then invokes TLSX_KeyShare_FreeAll(), which attempts to call ForceZero()" printf("[*] Error path invoked: Calling TLSX_KeyShare_FreeAll() -> ForceZero()\n"); // If the pointer wasn't nulled out properly in the caller's context, this triggers UAF // For simulation, let's assume the pointer value was stale or not updated correctly in the struct context KyberKey* staleKey = myKey; if (staleKey != NULL) { ForceZero(staleKey); // Use-After-Free occurs here } } int main() { printf("=== CVE-2026-5460 PoC Simulation ===\n"); TLSX_KeyShare_ProcessPqcHybridClient(); printf("=== PoC Finished ===\n"); return 0; }