CVE-2026-41665 Samsung ONE 整数溢出漏洞

// PoC Concept for Integer Overflow in Buffer Size Calculation // This simulates the overflow in scratch buffer initialization #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdint.h> void simulate_tensor_allocation(size_t dim_x, size_t dim_y, size_t elem_size) { // Vulnerability: Integer overflow in size calculation // If dim_x * dim_y is very large, 'total_size' wraps around size_t total_size = dim_x * dim_y * elem_size; printf("Allocating buffer of size: %zu\n", total_size); // Allocation based on incorrect (small) size void *buffer = malloc(total_size); if (!buffer) { perror("malloc failed"); return; } // Initialization loop uses original dimensions, leading to overflow // In real scenario, this would be a memset or initialization loop printf("Initializing buffer based on original dimensions...\n"); for (size_t i = 0; i < dim_x; i++) { for (size_t j = 0; j < dim_y; j++) { // Calculate index to write size_t offset = (i * dim_y + j) * elem_size; // This write will overflow the allocated buffer if total_size wrapped around if (offset < total_size) { *((char*)buffer + offset) = 0; } else { printf("Heap corruption detected at index %zu\n", offset); free(buffer); return; } } } free(buffer); } int main() { // Trigger condition: Large intermediate tensors causing multiplication overflow // Example: 0x100000 * 0x10000 on 32-bit systems, or specific large values on 64-bit // that exceed the practical memory limits but wrap around in size_t arithmetic size_t large_dim = 1073741824; // 2^30 size_t another_dim = 2; size_t size_of_element = 4; // e.g., float printf("Attempting to trigger CVE-2026-41665 scenario...\n"); simulate_tensor_allocation(large_dim, another_dim, size_of_element); return 0; }