CVE-2026-41664: Samsung ONE 内存复制整数溢出漏洞

# PoC Concept for Integer Overflow in Tensor Size Calculation # Target: Samsung Open Source ONE < 1.30.0 # This script demonstrates the logic that triggers the overflow. def calculate_tensor_size(dimensions, dtype_size=4): """ Simulates the vulnerable size calculation logic. """ size = 1 for dim in dimensions: size *= dim # Simulate 32-bit integer overflow (wrap around) MAX_UINT32 = 0xFFFFFFFF if size > MAX_UINT32: size = size % (MAX_UINT32 + 1) return size * dtype_size # Scenario: Attacker crafts a tensor with dimensions that cause overflow # Example: A tensor with shape [0x10000, 0x10000] of 4-byte floats # Actual size = 0x10000 * 0x10000 * 4 = 2^32 * 4 bytes (Huge) # Calculated size (32-bit) = 0 * 4 = 0 bytes malicious_shape = [0x10000, 0x10000] allocated_buffer_size = calculate_tensor_size(malicious_shape) print(f"Malicious Shape: {malicious_shape}") print(f"Allocated Buffer Size (based on overflowed calc): {allocated_buffer_size} bytes") print("Vulnerability Triggered: attempting to copy massive data into tiny buffer...") # Real-world exploitation would involve passing this tensor to the ONE runtime, # causing a crash or memory corruption during the memcpy operation.