CVE-2025-58307: 华为屏幕录制框架UAF漏洞

// CVE-2025-58307 PoC - UAF in Screen Recording Framework // This is a conceptual PoC for demonstration purposes #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> // Simulated Screen Recording Framework structures typedef struct { void* recording_buffer; int buffer_size; int status; } ScreenRecorderContext; typedef struct { char* metadata; void (*cleanup)(void*); } RecordingMetadata; // Vulnerable function simulating UAF condition void trigger_uaf_vulnerability(ScreenRecorderContext* ctx) { RecordingMetadata* meta = (RecordingMetadata*)ctx->recording_buffer; // Free the buffer without clearing the pointer free(meta->metadata); free(meta); // UAF: Continue using freed memory // In real scenario, attacker could control this freed region printf("Accessing freed metadata: %s\n", meta->metadata); // Trigger cleanup with dangling pointer if (meta->cleanup) { meta->cleanup(meta); } } // Trigger function int main() { ScreenRecorderContext* ctx = (ScreenRecorderContext*)malloc(sizeof(ScreenRecorderContext)); ctx->recording_buffer = malloc(sizeof(RecordingMetadata)); RecordingMetadata* meta = (RecordingMetadata*)ctx->recording_buffer; meta->metadata = strdup("Recording session data"); meta->cleanup = NULL; // Trigger the UAF vulnerability trigger_uaf_vulnerability(ctx); free(ctx); return 0; } /* Attack Scenario: 1. Attacker gains local access to Huawei device with high privileges 2. Attacker triggers screen recording functionality 3. Through specific interaction, attacker causes memory to be freed while reference remains 4. Attacker reallocates freed memory with malicious data 5. When framework accesses dangling pointer, attacker-controlled data is processed 6. Potential for privilege escalation or arbitrary code execution */