CVE-2025-43236 Apple macOS类型混淆漏洞

/* * Conceptual Proof of Concept for CVE-2025-43236 (Type Confusion) * This code simulates the logic of a type confusion vulnerability leading to a crash. * Compile: gcc -o poc_cve202543236 poc_cve202543236.c */ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> // Structure representing Type A typedef struct { int id; void (*func_ptr)(void); } TypeA; // Structure representing Type B (different memory layout) typedef struct { int id; char data[32]; } TypeB; // Vulnerable function: assumes input is always TypeA void vulnerable_function(TypeA* obj) { printf("Object ID: %d\n", obj->id); // Triggering the vulnerability: calling a function pointer from TypeA // If the object is actually TypeB, data[0-3] (int) + data[4-7] (part of string) // might be interpreted as a function pointer, causing a segfault. printf("Executing function pointer...\n"); obj->func_ptr(); } void legitimate_callback() { printf("Callback executed successfully.\n"); } int main() { // Allocate memory for TypeB TypeB* malicious_obj = (TypeB*)malloc(sizeof(TypeB)); // Initialize TypeB malicious_obj->id = 1; // Fill data with garbage or specific bytes to mimic a corrupted function pointer memset(malicious_obj->data, 0x41, 32); // Set a fake address at the offset where func_ptr would be in TypeA *(unsigned long*)((char*)malicious_obj + sizeof(int)) = 0xDEADBEEF; printf("Attempting to trigger Type Confusion...\n"); // Cast TypeB to TypeA and pass to vulnerable function // This simulates the lack of type checking in the vulnerable component vulnerable_function((TypeA*)malicious_obj); free(malicious_obj); return 0; }