CVE-2023-53589 Linux内核iwlwifi驱动固件数据验证漏洞

// CVE-2023-53589 PoC - Conceptual exploit for iwlwifi n_channels validation bypass // This vulnerability requires local access and involves crafting malicious firmware responses // Note: Actual exploitation requires modifying firmware or using a compromised wireless device #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdint.h> // Simulated structures based on iwlwifi mvm MCC response #define MAX_CHANNELS 50 // Actual maximum channels in command response #define PAGE_SIZE 4096 // Simulated MCC response header from firmware struct iwl_mcc_update_resp { uint32_t n_channels; // Number of channels (vulnerable field) uint32_t mcc; // Mobile country code uint16_t channel_data[]; // Channel information array }; // Simulated command response structure struct iwl_mcc_update_cmd { uint32_t n_channels; uint32_t mcc; uint16_t channels[MAX_CHANNELS]; // Fixed-size array }; /* * Vulnerable function simulation - does NOT validate n_channels * In the real kernel, this would be in drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/mcc.c */ void vulnerable_mcc_handler(uint8_t *fw_response, size_t resp_size) { struct iwl_mcc_update_resp *resp = (struct iwl_mcc_update_resp *)fw_response; struct iwl_mcc_update_cmd cmd; // Vulnerable: trusts firmware's n_channels without validation printf("Firmware reports n_channels: %u\n", resp->n_channels); // This memcpy could read beyond allocated buffer if n_channels is corrupted size_t copy_size = resp->n_channels * sizeof(uint16_t); if (copy_size > PAGE_SIZE) { printf("[CRASH] n_channels=%u causes out-of-bounds access!\n", resp->n_channels); printf("[CRASH] Attempting to copy %zu bytes, page only has %d bytes\n", copy_size, PAGE_SIZE); // In kernel: this would cause a page fault / kernel panic return; } memcpy(cmd.channels, resp->channel_data, copy_size); printf("Copied %zu bytes of channel data\n", copy_size); } /* * Fixed function - validates n_channels strictly */ void fixed_mcc_handler(uint8_t *fw_response, size_t resp_size) { struct iwl_mcc_update_resp *resp = (struct iwl_mcc_update_resp *)fw_response; struct iwl_mcc_update_cmd cmd; // Fixed: strict validation of n_channels if (resp->n_channels != MAX_CHANNELS) { printf("[BLOCKED] Invalid n_channels=%u, expected %d\n", resp->n_channels, MAX_CHANNELS); return; } memcpy(cmd.channels, resp->channel_data, resp->n_channels * sizeof(uint16_t)); printf("Successfully processed MCC response\n"); } int main() { // Simulate a corrupted firmware response with oversized n_channels size_t fake_resp_size = sizeof(struct iwl_mcc_update_resp) + 10 * sizeof(uint16_t); uint8_t *fake_response = calloc(1, fake_resp_size); struct iwl_mcc_update_resp *resp = (struct iwl_mcc_update_resp *)fake_response; // Set n_channels to a value much larger than actual data (simulating corruption) resp->n_channels = 10000; // Way more than MAX_CHANNELS (50) printf("=== Testing Vulnerable Handler ===\n"); vulnerable_mcc_handler(fake_response, fake_resp_size); printf("\n=== Testing Fixed Handler ===\n"); fixed_mcc_handler(fake_response, fake_resp_size); free(fake_response); return 0; }